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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 93-1199
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MARVIN STONE, PETITIONER v. IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the sixth circuit
[April 19, 1995]

  Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
  We consider whether the filing of a timely motion for
reconsideration of a decision by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service's Board of Immigration Appeals
tolls the running of the 90-day period for seeking
judicial review of the decision.

                            I
  Petitioner, Marvin Stone, is a citizen of Canada and
a businessman and lawyer by profession.  He entered
the United States in 1977 as a nonimmigrant visitor for
business and has since remained in the United States.
  On January 3, 1983, Stone was convicted of conspiracy
and mail fraud, in violation of 18 U. S. C. 371 and
1341.  He served 18 months of a 3-year prison term.  In
March 1987, after his release, the INS served him with
an order to show cause why he should not be deported
as a nonimmigrant who had remained in the United
States beyond the period authorized by law.  In January
1988, after a series of hearings, an Administrative Law
Judge ordered Stone deported.  The ALJ concluded that
under the regulations in effect when Stone entered the
United States, an alien on a nonimmigrant for business
visa could remain in the country for an initial period not
to exceed six months with the privilege of seeking exten-
sions, which could be granted in 6-month increments.
8 CFR 214.2(b) (1977).  The ALJ ordered deportation
under 8 U. S. C. 1251(a)(2) (now 1251(a)(1)(B) (1988
ed., Supp. V)) based on petitioner's testimony that he
had remained in the United States since 1977 without
seeking any extension.  The ALJ denied Stone's applica-
tion for suspension of deportation under 8 U. S. C.
1254(a)(1), concluding that Stone's conviction of mail
fraud and 18-month incarceration barred him, as a
matter of law, from establishing -good moral character-
as required by 1254.  See 8 U. S. C. 1101(f)(7).
  Stone's administrative appeals were as follows: he
appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which
affirmed the ALJ's determinations and dismissed the
appeal on July 26, 1991; he filed a -Motion to Reopen
and/or to Reconsider- with the BIA in August 1991; on
February 3, 1993, some 17 months later, the BIA denied
the reconsideration motion as frivolous.
  Judicial review was sought next.  The record does not
give the precise date, but, sometime in February or
March 1993, Stone petitioned the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit for review of both the July 26, 1991,
deportation order and the February 3, 1993, order
denying reconsideration.  The Court of Appeals dis-
missed the petition for want of jurisdiction to the extent
the petition sought review of the July 26, 1991, order,
the underlying deportation determination.  The Court
held that the filing of the reconsideration motion did not
toll the running of the 90-day filing period for review of
final deportation orders.  13 F. 3d 934, 938-939 (CA6
1994).  We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among
the Circuits on the question, compare Akrap v. INS, 966
F. 2d 267, 271 (CA7 1992); and Nocon v. INS, 789 F. 2d
1028, 1033 (CA3 1986) (agreeing that the filing of a
reconsideration motion does not toll the statutory time
limit for seeking review of a deportation order), with
Fleary v. INS, 950 F. 2d 711, 713 (CA11 1992); Pierre v.
INS, 932 F. 2d 418, 421 (CA5 1991) (per curiam), Attoh
v. INS, 606 F. 2d 1273, 1275, n. 15 (CADC 1979), and
Bregman v. INS, 351 F. 2d 401, 402-403 (CA9 1965)
(holding that a petition to review a deportation order is
timely if filed within the statutory period following the
disposition of a timely-filed reconsideration motion), 511
U. S. ___ (1994).  We now affirm.

                           II
                            A
  Section 106(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) specifies that -a petition for review [of a final
deportation order] may be filed not later than 90 days
after the date of the issuance of the final deportation
order, or, in the case of an alien convicted of an aggra-
vated felony, not later than 30 days after the issuance
of such order.-  8 U. S. C. 1105a(a)(1) (1988 ed., and
Supp. V).  The clause pertaining to an -aggravated
felony- is not a factor in the analysis, petitioner's offense
not being within that defined term.  See 8 U. S. C.
1101(a)(43) (1988 ed., Supp. V).  He had the benefit of
the full 90-day filing period.  There is no dispute that a
deportation order -become[s] final upon dismissal of an
appeal by the Board of Immigration Appeals,- 8 CFR
243.1 (1977), and, the parties agree, the 90-day period
started on July 26, 1991.
  The parties disagree, however, regarding the effect
that petitioner's later filing of a timely motion to
reconsider had on the finality of the order.  Petitioner
contends that a timely motion to reconsider renders the
underlying order nonfinal, and that a petition seeking
review of both the order and the reconsideration denial
is timely if filed (as this petition was) within 90 days of
the reconsideration denial.  The INS argues that the
finality and reviewability of an order are unaffected by
the filing of a motion to reconsider or to reopen.  In its
view the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the
denial of the motion to reconsider but not to review the
original order.
  We considered the timeliness of a review petition
where there is a motion to reconsider or reopen an
agency's order in ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S.
270 (1987).  The Interstate Commerce Commission's
governing statute provided that, with certain exceptions,
judicial review of ICC orders would be governed by the
Hobbs Act, 28 U. S. C. 2341 et seq.  See Locomotive
Engineers, 482 U. S., at 277.  We held that -the timely
petition for administrative reconsideration stayed the
running of the Hobbs Act's limitation period until the
petition had been acted upon by the Commission.-  Id.,
at 284.  Our conclusion, we acknowledged, was in some
tension with the language of both the Hobbs Act, which
permits an aggrieved party to petition for review -within
60 days after [the] entry- of a final order, 28 U. S. C.
2344, and of 49 U. S. C. 10327(i), -which provides
that, `[n]otwithstanding' the provision authorizing the
Commission to reopen and reconsider its orders
(10327(g)), `an action of the Commission . . . is final on
the date on which it is served, and a civil action to
enforce, enjoin, suspend, or set aside the action may be
filed after that date.'-  Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S.,
at 284.  We found the controlling language similar to
the corresponding provision of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. 704, which provides
that -agency action otherwise final is final for the
purposes of this section [entitled `Actions Reviewable']
whether or not there has been presented or determined
an application for . . . any form of reconsideratio[n]--
-language [that] has long been construed . . . merely to
relieve parties from the requirement of petitioning for
rehearing before seeking judicial review . . . but not to
prevent petitions for reconsideration that are actually
filed from rendering the orders under reconsideration
nonfinal.-  Locomotive Engineers, supra, at 284-285.
  In support of that longstanding construction of the
APA language, we cited dicta in two earlier cases,
American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397
U. S. 532, 541 (1970); CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367
U. S. 316, 326-327 (1961), and the holding in Outland
v. CAB, 284 F. 2d 224, 227 (CADC 1960), a decision
cited with approval in both Black Ball and Delta.
Outland justified treating orders as nonfinal for purpos-
es of review during the pendency of a motion for
reconsideration in terms of judicial economy: -[W]hen the
party elects to seek a rehearing there is always the
possibility that the order complained of will be modified
in a way which renders judicial review unnecessary.-
Outland, supra, at 227.
  As construed in Locomotive Engineers both the APA
and the Hobbs Act embrace a tolling rule: The timely
filing of a motion to reconsider renders the underlying
order nonfinal for purposes of judicial review.  In
consequence, pendency of reconsideration renders the
underlying decision not yet final, and it is implicit in
the tolling rule that a party who has sought rehearing
cannot seek judicial review until the rehearing has
concluded.  4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
26:12 (2d ed. 1988).  United Transportation Union v.
ICC, 871 F. 2d 1114, 1118 (CADC 1989); Bellsouth Corp.
v. FCC, 17 F. 3d 1487, 1489-1490 (CADC 1994).
Indeed, those Circuits that apply the tolling rule have so
held.  See Fleary, 950 F. 2d, at 711-712 (deportation
order not reviewable during pendency of motion to
reopen); Hyun Joon Chung v. INS, 720 F. 2d 1471, 1474
(CA9 1984) (same).
  Section 106 of the INA provides that -[t]he procedure
prescribed by, and all the provisions of chapter 158 of
title 28, shall apply to, and shall be the sole and
exclusive procedure for, the judicial review of all final
orders of deportation . . . .-  8 U. S. C. 1105a(a) (1988
ed. and Supp. IV).  The reference to chapter 158 of Title
28 is a reference to the Hobbs Act.  In light of our
construction of the Hobbs Act in Locomotive Engineers,
had Congress used that Act to govern review of deporta-
tion orders without further qualification, it would follow
that the so-called tolling rule applied.
  The INS, however, proffers a different reading of
Locomotive Engineers.  Relying on our statement that
704 of the APA has been construed -not to prevent
petitions for reconsideration that are actually filed from
rendering the orders under reconsideration nonfinal,- 482
U. S., at 285 (emphasis supplied), the INS understands
Locomotive Engineers to set forth merely a default rule
from which agencies may choose to depart.  It argues
that it did so here.
  If the case turned on this theory, the question would
arise whether an agency subject to either the APA or
the Hobbs Act has the authority to specify whether the
finality of its orders for purposes of judicial review is
affected by the filing of a motion to reconsider.  The
question is not presented here.  Both the Hobbs Act and
the APA are congressional enactments, and Congress
may alter or modify their application in the case of
particular agencies.  We conclude that in amending the
INA Congress chose to depart from the ordinary judicial
treatment of agency orders under reconsideration.

                            B
  Congress directed that the Hobbs Act procedures
would govern review of deportation orders, except for 10
specified qualifications.  See 8 U. S. C. 1105a(a).  Two
of those exceptions are pertinent.  The first, contained
in 106(a)(1) of the INA, provides an alien with 90 days
to petition for review of a final deportation order (30
days for aliens convicted of an aggravated felony),
instead of the Hobbs Act's 60-day period.  See 8
U. S. C. 1105(a)(1).  The second and decisive exception
is contained in 106(a)(6), a provision added when Con-
gress amended the INA in 1990.  The section provides:
-[W]henever a petitioner seeks review of an order
under this section, any review sought with respect
to a motion to reopen or reconsider such an order
shall be consolidated with the review of the order.-
  By its terms, 106(a)(6) contemplates two petitions for
review and directs the courts to consolidate the matters.
The words of the statute do not permit us to say that
the filing of a petition for reconsideration or reopening
dislodges the earlier proceeding reviewing the underlying
order.  The statute, in fact, directs that the motion to
reopen or reconsider is to be consolidated with the
review of the order, not the other way around.  This
indicates to us that the action to review the underlying
order remains active and pending before the court.  We
conclude that the statute is best understood as reflecting
an intent on the part of Congress that deportation
orders are to be reviewed in a timely fashion after
issuance, irrespective of the later filing of a motion to
reopen or reconsider.
  Were a motion for reconsideration to render the
underlying order nonfinal, there would be, in the normal
course, only one petition for review filed and hence
nothing for the judiciary to consolidate.  As in Locomo-
tive Engineers itself, review would be sought after denial
of reconsideration, and both the underlying order and
the denial of reconsideration would be reviewed in a
single proceeding, in so far, at least, as denial of
reconsideration would be reviewable at all.  See Locomo-
tive Engineers, 482 U. S., at 280.  Indeed, the Ninth
Circuit, which before the 1990 amendment had held that
pendency of a reconsideration motion did render a
deportation order nonfinal, understood that the tolling
rule contemplates just one petition for review: -Congress
visualized a single administrative proceeding in which
all questions relating to an alien's deportation would be
raised and resolved, followed by a single petition in a
court of appeals for judicial review . . . .-  Yamada v.
INS, 384 F. 2d 214, 218 (CA9 1967).  The tolling rule is
hard to square with the existence of two separate
judicial review proceedings.
  Under the no-tolling rule, by contrast, two separate
petitions for review will exist in the normal course.  An
order would be final when issued, irrespective of the
later filing of a reconsideration motion, and the ag-
grieved party would seek judicial review of the order
within the specified period.  Upon denial of reconsidera-
tion, the petitioner would file a separate petition to
review that second final order.  Because it appears that
only the no-tolling rule could give rise to two separate
petitions for review simultaneously before the courts,
which it is plain 106(a)(6) contemplates, it would seem
that only that rule gives meaning to the section.
  Although the consolidation provision does not mention
tolling, see post, at ___ (Breyer, J., dissenting), tolling
would be the logical consequence if the statutory scheme
provided for the nonfinality of orders upon the filing of
a reconsideration motion.  Locomotive Engineers' conclu-
sion as to tolling followed as a necessary consequence
from its conclusion about finality.  Finality is the
antecedent question, and as to that matter the consolida-
tion provision speaks volumes.  All would agree that the
provision envisions two petitions for review.  See post,
at ___ (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Because only -final
deportation order[s]- may be reviewed, 8 U. S. C.
1105a(a)(1), it follows by necessity that the provision
requires for its operation the existence of two separate
final orders, the petitions for review of which could be
consolidated.  The two orders cannot remain final and
hence the subject of separate petitions for review if the
filing of the reconsideration motion rendered the original
order nonfinal.  It follows that the filing of the reconsid-
eration motion does not toll the time to petition for
review.  By speaking to finality, the consolidation
provision does say quite a bit about tolling.
  Recognizing this problem, petitioner at oral argument
sought to give meaning to 106(a)(6) by offering a
different version of what often might occur.  Petitioner
envisioned an alien who petitioned for review of a final
deportation order, and, while the petition was still
pending, went back to the agency to seek its reconsider-
ation or, if new evidence had arisen, reopening.  If, upon
denial of reconsideration or reopening, the alien sought
review, and the review of the original order were still
pending, 106(a)(6) would apply and the two petitions
would be consolidated.  The dissent relies on the same
assumed state of events.  See post, at ___.
  That construct, however, is premised on a view of
finality quite inconsistent with the tolling rule petitioner
himself proposes.  If, as petitioner advocates, the filing
of a timely petition for reconsideration before seeking
judicial review renders the underlying order nonfinal, so
that a reviewing court would lack jurisdiction to review
the order until after disposition of the reconsideration
motion, one wonders how a court retains jurisdiction
merely because the petitioner delays the reconsideration
motions until after filing the petition for judicial review
of the underlying order.  The policy supporting the
nonfinality rule-that -when the party elects to seek a
rehearing there is always a possibility that the order
complained of will be modified in a way which renders
judicial review unnecessary,- Outland, 284 F. 2d, at
227-applies with equal force where the party seeks
agency rehearing after filing a petition for judicial
review.  Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, whose decision in Outland we cited in
support of our construction in Locomotive Engineers, has
so held in the years following our decision.  See Wade
v. FCC, 986 F. 2d 1433, 1434 (CADC 1993) (per curiam)
(-The danger of wasted judicial effort . . . arises whether
a party seeks agency reconsideration before, simulta-
neous with, or after filing an appeal or petition for
judicial review-) (citations omitted).  The Wade holding
rested on, and is consistent with, our decision in a
somewhat analogous context that the filing of a Rule 59
motion to alter or amend a district court's judgment
strips the appellate court of jurisdiction, whether the
Rule 59 motion is filed before or after the notice of
appeal.  See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.,
459 U. S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam).  Our decision,
based on a construction of Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(4),
noted the -theoretical inconsistency- of permitting the
district court to retain jurisdiction to decide the Rule 59
motion while treating the notice of appeal as -adequate
for purposes of beginning the appeals process.-  Griggs,
supra, at 59.
  We need not confirm the correctness of the Wade
decision, but neither should we go out of our way to say
it is incorrect, as the petitioner and the dissent would
have us do.  The inconsistency in petitioner's construc-
tion of 106(a)(6) is the same inconsistency that we
noted in Griggs.  The petitioner assumes that a recon-
sideration motion renders the underlying order nonfinal
if the motion is filed before a petition for review but
that finality is unaffected if the reconsideration motion
is filed one day after the petition for review.  It is
implausible that Congress would direct different results
in the two circumstances.  At any rate, under
petitioner's construction the consolidation provision
would have effect only in the rarest of circumstances.
  When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume
it intends its amendment to have real and substantial
effect.  See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339
(1979) (Court must construe statute to give effect, if
possible, to every provision); Moskal v. United States,
498 U. S. 103, 109-111 (1990) (same).  Had Congress
intended review of INS orders to proceed in a manner
no different than review of other agencies, as petitioner
appears to argue, there would have been no reason for
Congress to have included the consolidation provision.
The reasonable construction is that the amendment was
enacted as an exception, not just to state an already
existing rule.  Section 106(a)(6) is an explicit exception
to the general applicability of the Hobbs Act procedures,
so it must be construed as creating a procedure different
from normal practice under the Act.  We conclude, as
did the Court of Appeals, see 13 F. 3d, at 938, and the
Seventh Circuit, see Akrap, 966 F. 2d, at 271, that the
consolidation provision Congress inserted when it
amended the Act in 1990 is best understood as reflecting
its expectation that in the particular context of INS
deportation orders the normal tolling rule will not apply.

                            C
  Underlying considerations of administrative and
judicial efficiency, as well as fairness to the alien,
support our conclusion that Congress intended to depart
from the conventional tolling rule in deportation cases.
  Deportation orders are self-executing orders, not
dependent upon judicial enforcement.  This accounts for
the automatic stay mechanism, the statutory provision
providing that service of the petition for review of the
deportation order stays the deportation absent contrary
direction from the court or the alien's aggravated felony
status.  See 8 U. S. C. 1105a(a)(3).  The automatic stay
would be all but a necessity for preserving the jurisdic-
tion of the court, for the agency might not otherwise
refrain from enforcement.  Indeed, the INA provides that
-nothing in this section [Judicial review of orders of
deportation and exclusion] shall be construed to require
the Attorney General to defer deportation of an alien
after the issuance of a deportation order because of the
right of judicial review of the order granted by this
section.-  8 U. S. C. 1105a(a)(8) (1988 ed., Supp. V).
And it has been the longstanding view of the INS, a
view we presume Congress understood when it amended
the Act in 1990, that a motion for reconsideration does
not serve to stay the deportation order.  8 CFR 3.8
(1977).  Cf. Delta Air Lines, 367 U. S., at 325-327
(certificate of public convenience and necessity effective
when issued though not final for purposes of judicial
review because of pendency of reconsideration motion).
  Were the tolling rule to apply here, aliens subject to
deportation orders might well face a Hobson's choice:
petition for agency reconsideration at the risk of immedi-
ate deportation, or forego reconsideration and petition
for review to obtain the automatic stay.  The choice is
a hard one in deportation cases, in that the consequenc-
es of deportation are so final, unlike orders in some
other administrative contexts.  Once an alien has been
deported, the courts lack jurisdiction to review the
deportation order's validity.  See 8 U. S. C. 1105a(c).
This choice is one Congress might not have wished to
impose on the alien.
  An alien who had filed for agency reconsideration
might seek to avoid immediate deportation by seeking a
judicial stay.  At oral argument, the petitioner suggested
a habeas corpus action as one solution to the dilemma.
Even on the assumption that a habeas corpus action
would be available, see 8 U. S. C. 1105a(a) (Exclusive-
ness of procedure), the solution is unsatisfactory.  In
evaluating those stay applications the courts would be
required to assess the probability of the alien's prevail-
ing on review, turning the stay proceedings into collater-
al previews of the eventual petitions for review-indeed
a preview now implicating the district court, not just the
court of appeals.  By inviting duplicative review in
multiple courts, the normal tolling rule would frustrate,
rather than promote, its stated goal of judicial economy.
  From an even more fundamental standpoint, the
policies of the tolling rule are at odds with Congress'
policy in adopting the judicial review provisions of the
INA.  The tolling rule reflects a preference to postpone
judicial review to ensure completion of the administra-
tive process.  Reconsideration might eliminate the need
for judicial intervention, and the resultant saving in
judicial resources ought not to be diminished by prema-
ture adjudication.  By contrast, Congress' -fundamental
purpose- in enacting 106 of the INA was -to abbreviate
the process of judicial review . . . in order to frustrate
certain practices . . . whereby persons subject to deporta-
tion were forestalling departure by dilatory tactics in the
courts.-  Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217, 224 (1963).
Congress' concern reflected the reality that -in a depor-
tation proceeding . . . as a general matter, every delay
works to the advantage of the deportable alien who
wishes merely to remain in the United States.-  INS v.
Doherty, 502 U. S. 314, 321-325 (1992).  Congress'
intent in adopting and then amending the INA was to
expedite both the initiation and the completion of the
judicial review process.  The tolling rule's policy of
delayed review would be at odds with the congressional
purpose.
  The dissent does not dispute that a principal purpose
of the 1990 amendments to the INA was to expedite
petitions for review and to redress the related problem
of successive and frivolous administrative appeals and
motions.  In the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L.
101-649, 104 Stat. 5048, Congress took five steps to
reduce or eliminate these abuses.  First, it directed the
Attorney General to promulgate regulations limiting the
number of reconsideration and reopening motions that
an alien could file.  545(b).  Second, it instructed the
Attorney General to promulgate regulations specifying
the maximum time period for the filing of those motions,
hinting that a 20-day period would be appropriate.  See
ibid.  Third, Congress cut in half the time for seeking
judicial review of the final deportation order, from 180
to 90 days.  See ibid.  Fourth, Congress directed the
Attorney General to define -frivolous behavior for which
attorneys may be sanctioned- in connection with admin-
istrative appeals and motions.  See ibid., 545(a).  In
the dissent's view, a fifth measure, the consolidation
provision, was added for no apparent reason and bears
no relation to the other amendments Congress enacted
at the same time.  It is more plausible that when
Congress took the first four steps to solve a problem, the
fifth-the consolidation provision-was also part of the
solution, and not a step in the other direction.  By
envisioning that a final deportation order will remain
final and reviewable for 90 days from the date of its
issuance irrespective of the later filing of a reconsidera-
tion motion, Congress' amendment eliminates much if
not all of the incentive to file a meritless reconsideration
motion, and, like the other amendments adopted at the
same time, expedites the time within which the judicial
review process of the deportation order begins.

                            D
  A consideration of the analogous practice of appellate
court review of district court judgments confirms the
correctness of our construction of Congress' language.
The closest analogy to the INS' discretionary petition for
agency reconsideration is the Rule 60(b) motion for relief
from judgment.  The effect of Rule 60(b) motions (at
least when made more than 10 days after judgment, an
exception discussed below), on the finality and appeal-
ability of district court judgments is comparable to the
effect of reconsideration motions on INS orders.  With
the exception noted, the filing of a Rule 60(b) motion
does not toll the running of the time for taking an
appeal, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b); 11 C. Wright &
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 2871 (1973)
(Wright & Miller), and the pendency of the motion
before the district court does not affect the continuity of
a prior-taken appeal.  See ibid.  And last but not least,
the pendency of an appeal does not affect the district
court's power to grant Rule 60 relief.  See Standard Oil
Co. of Cal. v. United States, 429 U. S. 17, 18-19 (1976)
(per curiam); Wright & Miller, 2873 (1994 Supp.).  A
litigant faced with an unfavorable district court judg-
ment must appeal that judgment within the time
allotted by Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4, whether or not the
litigant first files a Rule 60(b) motion (where the Rule
60 motion is filed more than 10 days following judg-
ment).  Either before or after filing his appeal, the
litigant may also file a Rule 60(b) motion for relief with
the district court.  The denial of the motion is appeal-
able as a separate final order, and if the original appeal
is still pending it would seem that the court of appeals
can consolidate the proceedings.  In each of these
respects, the practice of litigants under Rule 60(b) is,
under our construction, identical to that of aliens who
file motions for reconsideration before the BIA.  In each
case two separate post-decision appeals are filed.
  For reasons not relevant here, in 1991 the Rules of
Appellate Procedure were amended to provide that Rule
60(b) motions filed within 10 days of a district court's
judgment do toll the time for taking an appeal.  See
Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(4)(F).  That amendment added
Rule 60(b) motions filed within 10 days of judgment to
a list of other post-trial motions that toll the running of
the time for appeal, a list that includes Rule 59 motions
to alter or amend a judgment.  See Fed. Rule App. Proc.
4(a)(4)(C).  A consideration of this provision of the
appellate rules is quite revealing.  The list of post-trial
motions that toll the time for appeal is followed, and
hence qualified, by the language interpreted in Griggs,
language that provides in express terms that these
motions also serve to divest the appellate court of
jurisdiction where the motions are filed after appeal is
taken.
  The language of Rule 4 undermines the dissent's
reliance on a presumption that appellate court jurisdic-
tion once asserted is not divested by further proceedings
at the trial or agency level.  See post, at ___.  Indeed,
the practice is most often to the contrary where appel-
late court review of district court judgments subject to
post-trial motions is concerned.  See Fed. Rule App.
Proc. 4(a)(4) (specifying that the majority of post-judg-
ment motions filed with the district court divest the
appellate court of jurisdiction that had once existed).  A
district court judgment subject to one of these enumerat-
ed motions, typified by Rule 59, is reviewable only after,
and in conjunction with, review of the denial of the post-
trial motion, and just one appeal pends before the
appellate court at any one time.
  In short, the Rules of Appellate Procedure evince a
consistent and coherent view of the finality and appeal-
ability of district court judgments subject to post-trial
motions.  The majority of post-trial motions, such as
Rule 59, render the underlying judgment nonfinal both
when filed before an appeal is taken (thus tolling the
time for taking an appeal), and when filed after the
notice of appeal (thus divesting the appellate court of
jurisdiction).  Other motions, such as Rule 60(b) motions
filed more than 10 days after judgment, do not affect the
finality of a district court's judgment, either when filed
before the appeal (no tolling), or afterwards (appellate
court jurisdiction not divested).  Motions that do toll the
time for taking appeal give rise to only one appeal in
which all matters are reviewed; motions that do not toll
the time for taking an appeal give rise to two separate
appellate proceedings that can be consolidated.

                            E
  Our colleagues in dissent agree that the consolidation
provision envisions the existence of two separate peti-
tions for review.  See post, at ___.  To give the provision
meaning while at the same time concluding that the
tolling rule applies, the dissent is compelled to conclude
that a reconsideration motion before the BIA renders the
original order nonfinal if made before a petition for
judicial review is filed but does not affect the finality of
the order if filed afterwards.  See post, at ___.  The
hybrid tolling rule the dissent suggests has no analogue
at all in the appellate court-district court context.  On
the contrary, as we have just observed, the uniform
principle where appellate review of district court judg-
ments is concerned is that motions that toll produce but
one appeal, motions that do not toll produce two.  It is
only by creating this new hybrid that the dissent can
give meaning to the consolidation provision, and avoid
the Hobson's choice for the alien.  While litigants who
practice before the district courts and the BIA will have
familiarity with both types of post-trial motions dis-
cussed above, and will have no difficulty practicing
under the rule we announce today, practitioners would
have no familiarity with the hybrid tolling rule the
dissent is compelled to devise in order to give the
consolidation provision meaning.
  It is worthwhile pausing to consider just how many
steps the dissent must take to reconcile the consolidation
provision with the tolling rule it prefers.  The dissent's
construction would require that the Court conclude,
without any briefing, that our decision in Griggs does
not apply to agency review.  The dissent would as well
disrupt administrative law in general by overturning the
practice of the circuit court with the most experience
reviewing agency decisions when faced with agency
reconsideration motions made after petition for review
(the District of Columbia Circuit), thereby resolving a
circuit split without any briefing or argument.  See post,
at ___.  Our construction avoids each of these extraordi-
nary steps.  It creates a practice parallel to that of
appellate courts reviewing district court judgments
subject to pending Rule 60(b) motions filed more than 10
days after judgment and requires us to take no firm
position on whether Griggs applies to agency review
where tolling does occur.
  But the full import of our decision in Griggs, and the
concomitant problem addressed in Wade, are in some
sense secondary to our fundamental point of dispute
with the dissent.  In our view the consolidation provi-
sion reflects Congress' intent to depart from the normal
tolling rule in this context, whereas on the dissent's
view it does not.  Congress itself was explicit in stating
that the consolidation provision is an exception to the
applicability of the Hobbs Act procedures, see supra, at
___, and it took the deliberate step of amending the Act
in 1990 to add the provision.  The challenge for the
dissent is not, then, just to give the consolidation
provision some work to do that is consistent with the
tolling rule, but to give it some work as an exception to
the applicability of the Hobbs Act procedures, a meaning
that explains why Congress might have taken trouble to
add it.  The dissent's construction of the consolidation
provision gives it effect, if any, only in what must be
those rare instances where aliens first petition for
judicial review and then seek agency reconsideration.
And, more important, its construction cannot account for
Congress' decision to amend the Act in 1990 to provide
that the Hobbs Act procedures, which in the normal
course include the tolling rule, shall apply -except- for
the consolidation provision.

                            F
  Whatever assessment Congress might have made in
enacting the judicial review provisions of the INA in the
first instance, we conclude from the consolidation
provision added in 1990 that it envisioned two separate
petitions filed to review two separate final orders.  To be
sure, it would have been preferable for Congress to have
spoken with greater clarity.  Judicial review provisions,
however, are jurisdictional in nature and must be
construed with strict fidelity to their terms.  As we have
explained:
-Section 106(a) is intended exclusively to prescribe
and regulate a portion of the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.  As a jurisdictional statute, it must
be construed both with precision and with fidelity to
the terms by which Congress has expressed its
wishes.-  Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S. 206,
212 (1968).
This is all the more true of statutory provisions specify-
ing the timing of review, for those time limits are, as we
have often stated, -mandatory and jurisdictional,-
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U. S. 33, 45 (1990), and are not
subject to equitable tolling.  See Fed. Rule App. Proc.
26(b).
                       *    *    *
  The consolidation provision in 106(a)(6) reflects
Congress' understanding that a deportation order is
final, and reviewable, when issued.  Its finality is not
affected by the subsequent filing of a motion to reconsid-
er.  The order being final when issued, an alien has 90
days from that date to seek review.  The alien, if he
chooses, may also seek agency reconsideration of the
order and seek review of the disposition upon reconsider-
ation within 90 days of its issuance.  Where the original
petition is still before the court, the court shall consoli-
date the two petitions.  See 8 U. S. C. 106(a)(6).
  Because Stone's petition was filed more than 90 days
after the issuance of the BIA's July 26, 1991, decision,
the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review that
order.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

                                      It is so ordered.